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Abstract: In systems biology, questions concerning the
molecular and cellular makeup of an organism are of
utmost importance, especially when trying to understand
how unreliable components—like genetic circuits, bio-
chemical cascades, and ion channels, among others—
enable reliable and adaptive behaviour. The repertoire
and speed of biological computations are limited by
thermodynamic or metabolic constraints: an example can
be found in neurons, where fluctuations in biophysical
states limit the information they can encode—with almost
20–60% of the total energy allocated for the brain used
for signalling purposes, either via action potentials or by
synaptic transmission. Here, we consider the imperatives
for neurons to optimise computational and metabolic
efficiency, wherein benefits and costs trade-off against
each other in the context of self-organised and adaptive
behaviour. In particular, we try to link information
theoretic (variational) and thermodynamic (Helmholtz)
free-energy formulations of neuronal processing and
show how they are related in a fundamental way through
a complexity minimisation lemma.
Introduction
The design of engineered and biological systems is influenced by
a balance between the energetic costs incurred by their operation
and the benefits realised by energy expenditure. This balance is set
via trade-offs among various factors, many of which act as
constraints. In contrast to engineering systems, it has only been
possible recently to experimentally manipulate biological sys-
tems—at a cellular level —to study the benefits and costs that
interact to determine adaptive fitness [1,2]. One such example is
the nervous system, where metabolic energy consumption
constrains the design of brains [3]. In this review paper, we start
by defining computation and information in thermodynamic terms
and then look at neuronal computations via the free-energy
principle. We then consider the efficiency of information
processing in the nervous system and how the complexity of
information processing and metabolic energy consumption act as
constraints. The final section tries to integrate these perspectives:
In brief, we will argue that the principle of maximum efficiency
applies to both information processing and thermodynamics; such
that—for a given level of accuracy—statistically and metabolically
efficient brains will penalise the use of complex representations
and associated commodities like energy.
Information Is Physical
A widely used term in neuroscience is ‘‘neuronal computation’’;
but what does computation mean? Simply put, any transformation
of information can be regarded as computation, while the transfer
of information from a source to a receiver is communication [4].
To understand the physical basis of computation, let us reconsider
Feynman’s example of a physical system whose information can be
read out. The example is intentionally artificial, to keep the physics
simple, but has a direct parallel to neuroscience, as we will show at
the end. Consider a box that it is filled with an ideal gas containing
N atoms. This occupies a volume V1, in which we can ignore forces
of attraction or repulsion between the particles. Now suppose that
the answer to a question is ‘‘yes’’ if all N atoms are on the right-
hand side of the box, and ‘‘no’’ if they are on the left. We could use
a piston to achieve this. By compressing the gas into a smaller
volume V2, a piston performs the work
dW~PdV ð1Þ
Classical thermodynamics tells us that the pressure and volume of
an ideal gas are linked such that
PV~NkT ð2Þ
where k is Boltzmann’s constant and the temperature T is assumed
constant. The work done on the gas is then:
dW~
ðV2
V1
NkT
V
dV~NkT(lnV2{lnV1) ð3Þ
As we compress the gas, the atoms speed up and attain kinetic
energy, hence heating the box. According to the conservation of
energy, the work done on the gas is converted to heat. This heat is
dissipated to the external environment to keep the temperature
constant. This means that the internal energy U of all the particles
remains unchanged, such that the work done by the system or
change in Helmholtz free energy A=U–TS reduces to the change in
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thermodynamic entropy S= kH, where H is Shannon entropy:
dA~{dW~dU{kTdH[dH~N(lnV2{lnV1) ð4Þ
For a single gas particle, with V2~
1
2
V1 we find that Shannon
entropy decreases by ln 2. This means that by compressing the gas
there are fewer places that the particles can occupy and we are less
uncertain about their whereabouts. In short, we have gained
information. What have we learned from this exercise? To obtain
information—in other words, to reduce entropy or average
uncertainty —one has to perform work. More generally, Land-
auer’s seminal work showed that energy is required when
information is erased or deleted via irreversible operations [5,6].
In the context of noise or communication, the deletion of incorrect
bits therefore requires the dissipation of energy. This dissipation is
decreased at lower temperatures because of reduced thermal
noise—lower temperatures facilitate a reduction of energy
expenditure.
In the brain, volume changes are not the primary mode of
conveying information. Instead, the compartments present in the
brain, ranging from synaptic clefts to organelles, maintain a
relatively constant volume over several seconds at least. What
changes on a short time scale are the numbers of molecules, such
as transmitters or ions, in these compartments. If we translate
volumes to concentrations ci=N/Vi, the change in entropy due to
information transfer becomes
dH~N ln
V2
V1
 
?dH~N ln
c1
c2
 
ð5Þ
The work is then dW~NkT ln
c1
c2
 
. If the molecules are charged,
the chemical potential sets up an electrical potential (called the
Nernst potential), which is the basis for much of the signalling
within the brain. For some molecules, such as Na+ and K+ ions,
the concentration changes during electrical signalling are minis-
cule relative to the total concentrations of these molecules. By
linearising dW in the concentration changes, we can easily
compute the energetic cost of neuronal signals [7].
In the examples above, the system remains in thermodynamic
equilibrium. Recent progress has been made in describing the
relationship between Helmholtz free energy and work when the
system is driven far from equilibrium—for example, if the gas was
compressed quickly. In this more general setting, the Jarzynski
equality states [8]:
E {dW½ §dA~{kT lnE exp dW
kT
  
ð6Þ
where the expectation E[?]is over an ensemble of paths from the
initial to final states. Crucially, the change in Helmholtz free
energy (and expected work) does not depend upon the path or the
rate at which external parameters (like volume) change. Notice
that Equation 4 is a special case of Equation 6, when there is only
one (infinitely slow) path.
Summary
In summary, changing the state of a system necessarily entails a
change in Helmholtz free energy that is equivalent to the work
done on the system. Under isothermal conditions, this changes the
thermodynamic entropy, which can be regarded as the average
uncertainty or information we have about the (microscopic) state
of the system. So is this sufficient to establish the link between
thermodynamic free energy and information processing? Not
really: because the information here is about the (microscopic)
state of the system in question. This does not speak to
representational information of the sort associated with biological
computations or communication: information of this sort reflects
how one system represents another. In the next section, we
consider a purely information theoretic perspective on computa-
tion that invokes free energy and entropy of a fundamentally
different sort.
The Free-Energy Principle
Equation 4 shows how the basic laws of classical thermody-
namics connect the Helmholtz free energy of a system to its
entropy, where entropy corresponds to the disorder or average
uncertainty about its state. In biological systems, there is a natural
tendency to resist disorder—at multiple levels of organisation. The
maintenance of sensory and physiological states within character-
istic bounds is typical of biological systems and usually relies on
some sort of regulatory process, i.e., homeostasis [9,10]. Mathe-
matically, this can be expressed by saying that the (sensory) states
of biological systems have characteristically low Shannon entropy,
where—under ergodic assumptions—Shannon entropy is (almost
surely) the long-term average of self information or surprise (see
below). An ergodic system has an invariant phase volume [11],
which is a necessary condition for an organism to exist—in the
sense that it would otherwise transgress phase boundaries and
cease to exist [12].
Here, the Shannon entropy plays the same role as thermody-
namic entropy but measures the dispersion not over microstates of
a thermodynamic (canonical) ensemble, but over some phase
functions or macroscopic variables that change with time. These
variables can take values that are relatively frequent (low surprise)
or infrequent (high surprise). Shannon entropy reflects the average
surprise of these variables as they fluctuate over time. By
minimising the surprise associated with environmental fluctuations
(sensory input), an organism can maintain its physiological states
within bounds [13,14].
To evaluate surprise, biological systems need to infer the
probability of each sensory fluctuation they encounter. In systems
like the brain, these inferences need to be made in the blink of an
eye. However, calculating the requisite probabilities can be an
intricate and lengthy process, making such computations practi-
cally intractable. In 1972, the physicist Richard Feynman came up
with a clever trick for calculating probabilities (approximately but
very efficiently) using variational free energy [15]. The trick is to
convert a difficult probability density integration problem into an
easy optimisation problem by minimising a free energy bound on
the quantity of interest—in our case, the surprise of sensory input.
In brief, this entails adjusting probability distributions over the
causes of sensory input until they minimise the free energy of
sensory input. Notice that we have introduced the notion of causes
or hidden states of the world that are responsible for generating
sensory samples. Heuristically, this means the system or agent has
a model of the world that it uses to evaluate the likelihood or
surprise of a sensation. Mathematically, hidden states are fictive
variables that are necessary to construct a variational free energy
bound on surprise, as we will see next.
Let us assume that self-organising systems like the brain
represent their environment probabilistically, in terms of hidden
states that cause sensory input. For example, an agent might
believe its visual sensations were caused by a bird flying across its
field of view. These beliefs can be regarded as real-valued, time-
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dependent internal or representational states m(t)[R. These
internal states encode a conditional probability density q(yDm)
over hidden states in the world y(t)[Y—such as the motion,
colour, and size of the bird. The objective is to minimise the
surprise{ln p(sDm) of sensations s(t)[S. Here, m denotes a model
entailed by a system or an agent, and p(sDm) is the probability of
observing a particular state under that model. The model is
effectively used to generate hypotheses that explain sensory input
in terms of hidden states or representations—such as a bird in
flight.
As noted above, minimising surprise directly is an intractable
problem, so surprise is replaced with its variational free energy
bound [15]. This free energy is a function of sensory and internal
states and can now be minimised with respect to the internal states:
F tð Þ~Eq U s,yð Þ½ {H q y mjð Þ½ 
~{ln p s mjð ÞzD q yð Þ p y s,mjð Þk½ 
ð7Þ
Here, U(t) =2ln p(s(t), y(t)|m) corresponds to an internal energy
under a generative model of the world, described in terms of the
density over sensory and hidden states p(s,y|m). In Equation 7 and
throughout H[p] =Ep[2ln p] denotes the entropy of a probability
distribution. Comparison with Equation 4 explains why F(t) is
called free energy—by analogy with its thermodynamic homo-
logue that is defined as internal energy minus entropy. However, it
is important to note that variational free energy is not the
Helmholtz free energy in Equation 4—it is a functional of a
probability distribution over hidden (fictive) states encoded by
internal states q(y|m), not the probability distribution over the
(physical) internal states. This is why variational free energy
pertains to information about hidden states that are represented,
not the internal states that represent them. In other words, the
variational free energy measures the information represented by
internal states, not internal states per se. Later, we will try to
establish the link between variational and Helmholtz free energies.
First, we consider the computational implications of minimising
variational free energy.
In short, free energy finesses the evaluation of surprise—where
an agent can evaluate free energy fairly easily, given the internal
energy or a generative model of its environment. The second
equality in Equation 7 says that free energy is always greater than
surprise, because the second term (Kullback-Leibler divergence) is
nonnegative. This means that when free energy is minimised with
respect to the internal states, free energy approximates surprise
and the conditional density approximates the posterior density
over hidden states:
D q y mjð Þ p y s,mjð Þk½ &0[q y mjð Þ&p y s,mjð Þ ð8Þ
This is known as approximate Bayesian inference, which becomes
exact when the conditional and posterior densities have the same
form [16]. Intuitively, minimising free energy renders the
conditional density the true posterior density over hidden states,
where both are informed by—or conditioned on—sensory
information. In Bayesian parlance, a posterior density describes
a belief after sampling some data—in contrast to a prior belief that
existed before the data were available. Minimising variational free
energy can therefore be regarded using sensory evidence to update
prior beliefs to approximate posterior beliefs.
How can we place a concept like variational free energy in the
context of neuronal computation? This has a long history—
originating in Geoffrey Hinton [17,18] and Douglas Hofstadter’s
[19] work using Ising models for inference in artificial neural
networks. Hinton and colleagues realised that variational free
energy was mathematically equivalent to the cost function for
inference in a neural network, such as a Hopfield model [20]—the
difference between the prediction made by the neural network and
what it actually produced as an output, i.e., the prediction error.
These ideas were subsequently absorbed into the free-energy
principle [21,22], whose key insight was that to reduce the entropy
of sensations, the system had to act on the environment. The
solution is to assume that both the internal states of the system and
its action minimise variational free energy (and implicitly surprise).
This dual minimisation maps nicely onto perception and action,
where variational free energy can be reduced by optimising
internal (representational) states or sensory states through active
sensory sampling. This is known as active inference and essentially
compels organisms to selectively sample what they expect to
sample.
Under certain statistical assumptions, free energy is essentially
the difference between the agent’s predictions and the actual
sensations sampled [22]. Therefore, minimising the free energy is
equivalent to reducing prediction error and hence surprise [14].
To minimise free energy or prediction error, the brain can either
change its prediction to match sensory input or it can change what
it samples to match its predictions [21]. This suggests that the
brain is continually making predictions and reevaluating them by
comparing inputs with internal predictions to make sense of the
world. Is there any empirical evidence that this scheme operates in
the nervous system?
Volunteers in a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner
watched two sets of moving dots—one random and the other
moving coherently. They showed patterns of distributed brain
activation that could only be explained in terms of top-down
predictions from deep in the brain to visual centres in the occipital
cortex. In other words, top-down predictions from the extrastriate
cortex appeared to suppress prediction errors in the striate cortex
[23]. Assuming the visual system is a hierarchy of cortical areas,
such predictive coding enables predictions about hidden states of
the world—like coherent motion—to influence processing at lower
levels [23]. Similarly, in the auditory cortex, electroencephalo-
graphic signals from higher processing centres change brain
activity in lower areas [24]. Using dynamic causal modelling,
Garrido et al. [24] found that models with top-down connections
explained empirical electrophysiological data far better than the
models with only bottom-up connections. Garrido et al. [24]
argued that these neuronal responses were consistent with the
brain’s attempt to conciliate predictions at one level with those in
other levels—in other words, to reduce hierarchical prediction
error.
What sort of neuronal architectures mediate this prediction
error minimisation—or predictive coding? In mammalian brains,
cortical areas are organised hierarchically [25,26], wherein
populations of neurons can encode expected states of the world
and provide top-down predictions to lower or sensory levels
[27,28]. For example, top-down connections from pyramidal
neurons in the deeper layers of the cortex are thought to provide
predictions to superficial pyramidal populations of a lower area.
This enables forward connections from superficial pyramidal
neurons to convey prediction errors, creating recurrent dynamics
that suppress prediction errors at each level of the cortical
hierarchy [29–31]. The precision of these errors can be modulated
by neuromodulation [32]. Such rescaling of prediction errors in
proportion to their precision is simply a form of gain control
[33,34] and may mediate attention. In short, the wetware
necessary to minimise free energy appears to be available and is
remarkably consistent with its known functional anatomy.
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In summary, biological organisms are open self-organising
systems that operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium [35].
The free-energy principle suggests that organisms avoid phase
transitions by minimising (a variational free energy bound on) the
Shannon entropy of their sensory states. But how does one
reconcile the need of an animal to survive (by avoiding phase
transitions) with its innate tendency to forage or explore? This
apparent paradox is resolved by noting that active inference is
driven by prior beliefs—and these beliefs can entail exploration. In
other words, agents expect to explore and would be surprised if
they did not. We will return to the central role of priors in the last
section.
Summary
Perception minimises prediction error by optimising synaptic
activity (perceptual inference), synaptic efficacy (learning and
memory), and synaptic gain (attention and salience) [14]. In doing
so, we form an optimal representation of the sensorium. Such
strategies of optimisation are mathematically equivalent to
predictive coding [36,37] or, as we will see later, maximising the
mutual information between sensations and the responses they
evoke [38,39]. In the embodied context of action on the
environment, free-energy minimisation can also explain active
inference in the exteroceptive domain [40] and homoeostasis
through minimising interoceptive prediction errors. In short, the
idea of free-energy minimisation, stemming from Feynman’s
beautiful piece of mathematics, allows us to consider perception
and action under a general framework—and produce testable
hypotheses.
Information Efficiency
In the previous section, we described how variational free
energy is intricately linked to surprise—the free-energy principle
tells us that an organism should strive to reduce its prediction error
thereby reducing free energy. The connection between free energy
and information—although obvious—is seldom commented upon
(see Table 1 in [41]). To minimise free energy, the expected
prediction error has to be minimised while, at the same time, the
entropy of the conditional density is maximised. This is slightly
paradoxical because the purpose of free-energy minimisation is to
reduce sensory entropy. However, Equation 7 shows that if the
entropy of sensory states H[p(s|m)] is minimised vicariously by
minimising free energy over time, then the entropy of the
conditional density H[q(y|m)]must be maximised at each point
in time. This follows from a need to balance accuracy and
complexity of the sort seen in Occam’s razor. We will return to this
in a later section in the context of the principle of maximum
entropy [42]. In this section, we focus on information theory as a
way of describing the quality of representations and the constraints
under which these representations are formed.
We know that all animals process and transmit information to
survive and reproduce in an uncertain environment. A principled
way to understand such signal processing was absent until Claude
Shannon’s seminal work on information theory [43]. To
understand how messages can be transferred efficiently via
telegraphic wires, Shannon derived powerful formalisms that
provided fundamental limits on communication [43]. On one
hand, information theory allowed optimisation of complicated
devices like satellite communication systems. On the other hand, it
fitted comfortably with the bounds established by thermodynamics
[44]. Some years after its inception, biologists used information
theory to study the efficiency of processing in the nervous system.
It was realised that efficient representations were permitted by
statistical regularities in the sensorium, i.e., hidden states and their
sensory consequences that have low entropy (see [45]). However,
the influence of random fluctuations and other constraints prohibit
a completely efficient encoding of hidden states in the world.
In the nervous system, limited bandwidth and dynamic range
create an information bottleneck due to the limited response
ranges of the neurons in sensory epithelia [46–48]. Atick [45]
suggests that these bottlenecks can also result from computational
limitations at higher levels of sensory processing—citing as an
example the ‘‘attention bottleneck,’’ where there is constriction of
information processing—in bits per unit time—somewhere
between area V4 and the inferotemporal cortex. In brief, sensory
receptors are required to compress an enormous range of
statistically redundant sensory data into their limited range. One
way to achieve this is by compression —imagine an architect’s
plan of your office. This does not include the dimensions of every
brick, just the information necessary to build the office. It has been
proposed that sensory systems also apply the principle of
compression. They sieve redundant information, such that only
information that is necessary to encode hidden states is retained
[46]—in engineering this is called a factorial code. Of course there
are many ways to describe such sensory encoding. Others include
but are not restricted to feature detection, filtering, etc. Among
these, schemes like linear predictive coding and minimum
description length formulations have a particularly close and
formal relationship with variational formulations.
Sensory receptors (mechanoreceptors, photoreceptors, and the
like) are thought to build a factorial representation of the world—
such that only independent bits of information are sampled
(Figure 1). Interestingly, this has been observed in the large
monopolar cells (LMC) in the blowfly compound eye [49].
Laughlin [49] measured the distribution of the fly’s natural
environment from horizontal scans of dry woodland and lake-side
vegetation and quantified the responses of light-adapted LMCs.
Laughlin [49] found that the LMC—known to respond to contrast
signals—is most sensitive around the most probable input
contrast—with sensitivity dropping to zero as the input became
more improbable.
The application of information theory to the nervous system is
formally pleasing and has provided some compelling insights.
However, it does have limits [50]: although it allows one to
quantify the transmission of information, it has no notion of
semantics. It only cares about how much information is present
but not about what that information represents. A widely used
information theoretic metric in neuroscience is the mutual
information, which measures how much a random variable tells
us about another random variable [51]. If s[S is a stimulus and
m[R is the representational response, the mutual information is
defined as:
I S;Rð Þ~D p s,m mjð Þ p s mjð Þp m mjð Þk½ 
~
ðð
p s,m mjð Þln p s,m mjð Þ
p s mjð Þp m mjð Þ dsdm
ð9Þ
Note that the joint density p(s,m|m) is not the generative model
p(s,y|m) of the previous section—it describes the joint distribution
of sensory and internal states, not the joint distribution of sensory
and hidden states. Equation 9 simply describes the divergence or
relative entropy between the joint density and the product of its
marginals. The mutual information is zero when the neuronal
representation is statistically independent of the stimulus and is
equal to the entropy of the stimulus when the representation
faithfully encodes the stimulus. Since the mutual information must
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lie between zero and channel capacity, it is only the channel
capacity that limits the information transfer between stimulus and
neuronal response.
Estimating channel capacity by maximising empirical estimates
of mutual information can be a difficult task, especially when the
experimenter has only an informed guess about the stimuli that
evoke responses. One way to finesse this problem is to use adaptive
sampling of inputs, which hones in on stimuli that are maximally
informative about observed responses [52]. Assuming one knows
the stimuli to use, the next problem is the curse of dimensionality.
In other words, one requires an enormous amount of data to
estimate the probability densities required to quantify mutual
information. Although, sophisticated machine learning tools try to
estimate mutual information from limited data [53–55], the
numerics of mutual information are fraught with difficulties.
Summary
Irrespective of the thermodynamic or computational impera-
tives for a biological system, the simple observation that there
should be some statistical dependency between sensory samples
and the internal states that encode them means that sensory and
internal states should have a high mutual information. This leads
to the principles of maximum information transfer (a.k.a. infomax)
and related principles of minimum redundancy and maximum
efficiency [46–48]. Later, we will see how minimising variational
free energy maximises mutual information and what this implies
for metabolic costs in terms of Helmholtz free energy. First, we will
briefly review the biophysical and metabolic constraints on the
information processing that underlies active inference.
Is Inference Costly?
Hitherto, we have considered the strategies that neurons might
use for abstracting information from the sensorium. A reliable
representation is necessary for an animal to make decisions and
act. Such information processing comes at a price, irrespective of
whether the animal is at rest or not [56]. Cellular respiration
enables an organism to liberate the energy stored in the chemical
bonds of glucose (via pyruvate)—the energy in glucose is used to
produce ATP. Approximately 90% of mammalian oxygen
consumption is mitochondrial, of which approximately 20% is
uncoupled by the mitochondrial proton leak and 80% is coupled
to ATP synthesis [57]. Cells use ATP for cellular maintenance and
signalling purposes, via ion channels that use ATP hydrolysis to
transport protons against the electromotive force. Given that the
biophysical ‘‘cash-register’’ of a cell (the ATPases) can only handle
ATP—and not glucose—we will discuss brain metabolism in terms
of ATP.
In man, the brain constitutes just 2% of the body mass, while
consuming approximately 20% of the body’s energy expenditure
for housekeeping functions like protein synthesis, maintenance of
membrane potentials, etc. [58]. What consumes such remarkable
amounts of energy? Assuming a mean action potential (AP) rate of
4 Hz, a comprehensive breakdown of signalling costs suggests that
action potentials use around 47% of the energy consumed—
mainly to drive the Na+/K+ pump (Figure 2) [59]. This pump
actively pumps Na+ ions out of the neuron and K+ ions inside [60].
In doing so, the pump consumes a single ATP molecule for
transporting three Na+ ions out and two K+ ions in [61–63].
Measurements of ATP consumption from intracellular recordings
in fly photoreceptors show similar energy consumption to costs
obtained from whole retina oxygen consumption [64,65]. Indeed,
in the absence of signalling, the dominant cost of maintaining the
resting potential is attributable to the Na+/K+ pump. Attwell and
Laughlin [59] further estimated that out of 3.296109 ATP/s
consumed by a neuron with a mean firing rate of 4 Hz, 47% was
distributed for producing APs, while postsynaptic receptors
accounted for around 40% of the energy consumption (Figure 2).
These figures suggest that action potentials and synapses are the
main consumers of energy and that they determine the energy cost
in the nervous system.
Experimental studies have shown that neuronal performance is
related to energy consumption, both during rest and while
signalling [65]. What these studies show is obvious—there is no
free lunch. Neurons have to invest metabolic energy to process
information. The finite availability of ATP and the heavy demand
of neuronal activity suggest neuronal processing has enjoyed great
selective pressure. Metabolic energy costs limit not only the
possible behavioural repertoire but also the structure and function
of many organs, including the brain [3,66,67]. The nervous system
can use many tricks to promote energy efficiency. Neurons that use
sparse (or factorial) codes for communication [48,68] save on the
number of action potentials required to encode information, or
Figure 1. Redundancy reduction. The sensory environment of an animal is highly correlated (redundant). The animal’s job is to map such signals
as efficiently as possible to its neuronal representations, which are limited by their dynamic range. One way to solve this problem rests on de-
correlating the input to provide a minimum entropy description, followed by a gain controller. This form of sensory processing has been observed in
the experiments by Laughlin [49], where the circuit maps the de-correlated signal via its cumulative probability distribution to a neuronal response,
thereby avoiding saturation. Modified from [45].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003157.g001
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have topographical connectivity schemes to reduce the surface
area of axons connecting different brain areas [69–71]. Neurons
may also alter their receptor characteristics to match the
probability of inputs to form a matched filter [49]. Alternatively,
specialised signal processing could be employed to convert signals
from analogue representation to pulsatile—prohibiting accumula-
tion of noise during information transfer [72,73].
In short, nature can use various means to achieve the objective
of energy efficiency—see Box 1 for a summary of some strategies.
Energy consumption in single neurons depends on the types and
the numbers of ion-channels expressed on the lipid bilayer, their
kinetics, the cell’s size, and the external milieu that changes the
equilibrium conditions of the cell. Experimental measures from the
blowfly retina show that metabolic efficiency in graded potentials
(lacking voltage-gated Na+ channels) is at least as expensive as in
those neurons displaying action potentials—with the former
capable of higher transmission rates [74]. Similarly, in Drosophila
melanogaster photoreceptors, absence of Shaker K+ conductance
increases energetic costs by almost two-fold [75,76]. It has also
been suggested that the precise mix of synaptic receptors (AMPA,
NMDA, mGlu, Kainate, etc.)—that determine synaptic time
constants—influences the energetic cost of the single neuron [77].
Recent evidence indicates that the biophysical properties gener-
ating an action potential can be matched to make them energy
efficient [78–81]. Fast Na+ current decay and delayed K+ current
onset during APs in nonmyelinated mossy fibres in the rat
hippocampus minimise the overlap between the inward and
outward currents, resulting in a reduction of metabolic costs [81].
Similarly, incomplete Na+ channel inactivation in fast-spiking
GABAergic neurons during the falling phase of the AP reduces
metabolic efficiency of these neurons [78]. Applying numerical
optimisation to published data from a disparate range of APs,
Sengupta et al. [80] showed that there is no direct relationship
between size and shape of APs and their energy consumption. This
study further established that the temporal profile of the currents
underlying APs of some mammalian neurons are nearly perfectly
matched to the optimised properties of ionic conductances, so as to
minimise the ATP cost. All of these studies show that experimen-
tally measured APs are in fact more efficient than suggested by the
previous estimates of Attwell and Laughlin [59]. This was because
until 2001 experimental measurements of membrane currents
were scant, impeding the study of the overlap between Na+ and K+
currents. The effects of energy-efficient APs on cortical processing
were gauged by recalculating Attwell and Laughlin’s (2001)
estimates by first using the overlap factor of 1.2—found in mouse
cortical pyramidal cells—and then assuming the probability that a
synaptic bouton releases a vesicle in response to an incoming spike
remains at 0.25 [80]. Neurons that are 80% efficient have two
notable effects (Figure 3). First of all, the specific metabolic rate of
the cortical grey matter increases by 60%, and second, the balance
of expenditure shifts from action potentials to synapses (Figure 3,
cf. Figure 2) [80].
The principle of energy efficiency is not just linked to single
neurons. Energy budgets have been calculated for the cortex [82],
olfactory glomerulus [83], rod photoreceptors [84], cerebellum
[85], and CNS white matter [86], among others. These studies
highlight the fact that the movement of ions across the cell
membrane is a dominant cost, defined by the numbers and cellular
makeup of the neurons and the proportion of synaptic machinery
embedded in the cell membrane (Figure 4). Niven and Laughlin
[3] have argued that when signalling costs are high and resting
costs are low, representations will be sparse; such that neurons in a
population preferentially represent single nonoverlapping events
(also see [87]). Similarly, when resting costs are high and signalling
costs are low, the nervous system will favour the formation of
denser codes, where greater numbers of neurons within the
population are necessary to represent events [3].
Experimental studies of mammalian cortex suggest that the
cortex organises itself to minimise total wiring length, while
maximising various connectivity metrics [88]. Minimising wiring
lengths decreases the surface area of neuronal processes, reducing
the energy required for charging the capacitive cell membrane—to
sustain and propagate action potentials. In fact, theoretical
analyses in pyramidal and Purkinje cells have shown that the
dimensions and branching structure of dendritic arbours in these
neurons can be explained by minimising the dendritic cost for a
potential synaptic connectivity [89,90]. This can result from
increasing the repertoire of possible connectivity patterns among
different dendrites, while keeping the metabolic cost low [89,90].
Summary
In summary, we have reviewed several lines of evidence that
evolution tries to minimise metabolic costs, where—in the brain—
Figure 2. Attwell and Laughlin’s energy budget. Energy use by various neuronal (cellular) processes that produce, on average, 4 spikes per
second. Modified from [59].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003157.g002
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Box 1. Some principles of computational anatomy.
Dimensionality reduction: Sensory input is high dimen-
sional—a visual scene comprises differences in brightness,
colours, numbers of edges, etc. If the retina did not
preprocess this visual information, we would have to handle
around 36 Gb/s of broadband information, instead of
20 Mb/s of useful data [73]. Preprocessing increases the
metabolic efficiency of the brain by about 1,500 times. The
requisite dimensionality reduction is closely related to
minimising complexity—it is self-evident that internal
representations or models of the sensorium that use a small
number of dimensions or hidden states will have a lower
complexity and incur smaller metabolic costs.
Energy-efficient signalling: Action potentials (APs) are
expensive commodities, whether they are used for local
computation or long-distance communication [59]. Energy-
efficient APs are characterised by Na+ channel inactivation,
voltage-dependent channel kinetics, and corporative K+
channels—as described by multiple gating currents, in-
ward-rectifying K+ channels, and high channel densities [7].
These biophysical innovations enable a neuron to produce
efficient APs that use the minimal currents necessary to
generate a given depolarisation.
Component size and numbers: Action potentials travel
considerable distances along densely packed axons, collat-
erals, and dendrites. The capacitance that must be charged
by APs increases with membrane area [101], constraining the
number and length of neuronal processes. It is fairly
straightforward to show that—to maintain information
transfer—the optimal solution is to decrease the number
of components. Assuming all neurons have the same
thresholds and energy consumption, the energy-efficient
solution is to minimise the number of components, under
computational constraints dictated by the ecological niche
of the animal [101].
Modular design: Very-large-scale integration circuits sug-
gest an isometric scaling relation between the number of
processing elements and the number of connections (Rent’s
rule [102]). Neuronal networks have been shown to obey
Rent’s rule, exhibiting hierarchical modularity that optimises
a trade-off between physical cost and topological complex-
ity—wherein these networks are cost-efficiently wired [103].
A modular design balances the savings in metabolic costs,
while preserving computational capacities. Hierarchical
modularity also emerges under predictive coding [33]. In
this context, the brain becomes a model of its environment,
which through the separation of temporal scales necessarily
requires a hierarchical connectivity.
Parallel architecture: The brain processes information in
parallel—be it frequency analysis in the inner ear or
analysing different attributes of a visual scene using
functional segregation. This parallel architecture mirrors
those used in modern-day microprocessors. For example, a
fast single-core microprocessor may consume 5 Watts and
execute a program in 10 seconds. If we bring together two
single cores, power will double and execution time will
halve, still consuming 50 Joules. Alternatively, a slow double-
core microprocessor that expends 2.5 Watts of power to
execute the program in 15 seconds could consume only 7.5
Joules. This energy saving works because power is propor-
tional to frequency cubed; therefore, halving the frequency
reduces the speed by two but conserves eight times the
power, making the microprocessor four times as efficient. In
short, if parallel architectures are combined with slow
computing speeds, the resulting system is energetically
more efficient.
Analogue versus digital: If analogue computing is so
efficient [104], why don’t neurons operate on an all analogue
basis? The obvious answer is signal processing in the digital
(such as AP) domain enables noise suppression. Noise
accumulation in analogue systems [73] speaks to hybrid
processing—the use of analogue preprocessing before
optimal digitisation. APs are useful in this context because
they have an inbuilt threshold mechanism that attenuates
noise. If a presynaptic signal is encoded as an AP and
transmitted, there is hardly any conduction loss, thereby
enabling a reliable transfer of information.
Figure 3. A revised energy budget for signalling in the grey matter of the rat brain. Incorporating the increased efficiency of APs in
mammalian neurons into Attwell and Laughlin’s (Figure 2) original energy budget—for grey matter in the rat brain—reduces the proportion of the
energy budget consumed by APs. Modified from [80].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003157.g003
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these costs are primarily incurred by the restoration of transmem-
brane potentials, whose fluctuations encode or represent hidden
states of the world. This raises a question: is energy the only
constraint in the evolution of animals? Of course not—functional
constraints like reliability, speed, precision, etc. [67] and structural
constraints like optimal wiring [91] are equally important. For
example, a single action potential in the squid giant axon
consumes orders of magnitude more energy than a hippocampal
or a pyramidal neuron, yet evolution has invested that extra Joule
to buy speed [80,92]. In short, structure and function interact to
determine the fitness of an animal. Having surveyed the key
metabolic constraints under which neuronal processing must
proceed, we now try to integrate the information theoretic and
metabolic perspectives.
Thermodynamic Efficiency and Free-Energy
Minimisation
In this section, we gather together the imperatives for biological
self-organisation reviewed above. We hope to show that minimis-
ing variational free energy necessarily entails a metabolically
efficient encoding that is consistent with the principles of minimum
redundancy and maximum information transfer. In brief, we will
show that maximising mutual information and minimising
metabolic costs are two sides of the same coin: by decomposing
variational free energy into accuracy and complexity, one can
derive the principle of maximum mutual information as a special
case of maximising accuracy, while minimising complexity
translates into minimising metabolic costs.
Metabolic Efficiency and Free Energy
To connect the thermodynamic work or metabolic energy
required to represent hidden states to the variational free energy of
those representations, we need to consider the relationship
between representational internal states and the underlying
thermodynamic microstates. Recall that internal states m(t) are
deterministic quantities that encode a conditional density over
hidden states of the world. These macroscopic states can be
regarded as unconstrained internal variables of a biophysical system; for
example, the molar fractions of different molecules in a cellular
compartment. The underlying biophysical system can then be
associated with a (thermodynamic) canonical ensemble with
internal energy:
U~
X
i
piE mð Þi ð10Þ
Here, pi corresponds to the probability of a particular microscopic
state and Ei(m)to its corresponding energy. Given that the total
energy is conserved, this probability is given by the Gibbs measure
or Boltzmann distribution:
pi~exp
A{E mð Þi
kT
 
~
1
Z
exp {
E mð Þi
kT
 
A T ,mð Þ~{kT lnZ
~U{kTH pi½ ~U{TS
ð11Þ
Figure 4. Elements defining metabolic efficiency. Speed and precision defines the representational capacity of a neuron. Speed or bandwidth
is dependent on the membrane time constant and/or the spike rate of the neuron, while precision relies mainly on the types, numbers, and kinetics
of synapses and the channels, neuron volume, etc. An efficient brain will maximise speed and precision under energetic constraints.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003157.g004
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The partition function Z(T, m) ensures the probabilities sum to one,
while the last equality follows simply from the definition of entropy
H[pi] =Ei[2ln pi]. The Boltzmann distribution describes a system
that can exchange energy with a heat bath (or a large number of
similar systems) so that its temperature remains constant. The
Helmholtz free energy A(T, m) measures the work obtainable from
a closed thermodynamic system at a constant temperature and
volume—where a closed system can exchange energy with other
systems (but not mass).
The key result we will use from statistical thermodynamics is
that the Helmholtz free energy is minimised at equilibrium with
respect to any unconstrained internal variables for a closed system
at constant temperature T0,
A0~minm A0 T0,mð Þ ð12Þ
where A0(T0, m) is the free energy of the system at equilibrium or
steady state (i.e., constant entropy). This motivates the following
Lemma:
Lemma: (complexity minimisation) Minimising the complexity of a
conditional distribution—whose sufficient statistics are (strictly increasing
functions of) some unconstrained internal variables of a thermodynamic
system—minimises the Helmholtz free energy of that system.
Proof: Using standard results from Bayesian statistics [16], we
can express free energy as complexity minus accuracy
F mð Þ~D q y mjð Þ p y mjð Þk½ {Eq ln p s y,mjð Þ½ 
p y mjð Þ~q y m0jð Þ
ð13Þ
The first complexity term is the divergence between the
conditional distribution and the prior distribution under the
generative model. This effectively counts the degrees of freedom
used to encode or predict sensory input. The accuracy is simply
the expected log likelihood of the sensory input under the
conditional density encoded by internal states. The prior
distribution represents beliefs in the absence of sensory input.
This corresponds to the distribution encoded by internal states
m= m0 when deprived of input for a suitably long time—at which
point, we can assume thermodynamic equilibrium, such that
Helmholtz free energy is minimised (see Equation 12):
A0 T0,m0ð Þ~minm A0 T0,mð Þ[
m0~argminm A0 T0,mð Þ
ð14Þ
However, in the absence of input, variational free energy reduces
to complexity F0(m)$0, which—by Gibbs inequality—has a
minimum of zero. This means that complexity is also minimised.
F0 mð Þ~D q y mjð Þ q y m0jð Þk½ [
m0~argminm F0 mð Þ
ð15Þ
In sum, the internal states encoding prior beliefs about hidden
states of the world are those that minimise Helmholtz free energy
and the complexity defined by variational free energy.
Remarks: All we are saying here is that if a (neuronal) system
is deprived of sensory inputs it will obtain thermodynamic
equilibrium (or at least a nonequilibrium steady state) and will
therefore minimise Helmholtz free energy. This assumes, not
implausibly, a constant temperature and volume. Crucially, this is
precisely the brain state encoding prior beliefs about sensory input,
which means that it is the state of minimum computational
complexity. Heuristically, this means that one can associate the
complexity cost of variational free energy with metabolic cost—in
the sense that they share the same minimum. Crucially,
minimising fluctuations in Helmholtz free energy reduces meta-
bolic work by Equation 6. Interestingly, complexity cost also plays
a central role in free-energy formulations of optimal control and
economic theory [93,94]. Still et al. arrive at the same conclusions
by treating the thermodynamic system as having an implicit model
of its inputs—allowing them to establish the fundamental
equivalence between model inefficiency or complexity and
thermodynamic inefficiency [95]. However, both of these com-
pelling treatments consider homologues of Helmholtz free
energy—not variational free energy, which is a functional of a
probabilistic model (the conditional distribution).
Computational Efficiency and Free Energy
The complexity minimisation lemma suggests that commonly
occurring representational states—that are a priori most proba-
ble—are the least costly; for example, resting levels of transmem-
brane voltage or baseline firing rates. Rare excursions from these
states are associated with a high metabolic cost. But how does
minimising complexity relate to principles of minimum redun-
dancy? Because representations do not change sensory inputs, they
are only required to minimise the free energy of the conditional
density. Assuming conditional uncertainty is small, the conditional
density can be approximated with a point mass at ~m tð Þ, such that
q yð Þ~d y{~mð Þ and the free energy becomes (from Equation 13)
F tð Þ~{ln p s tð Þ m tð Þjð Þ{ln p m tð Þ mjð Þ[ð
dtF tð Þ!H p s m,mjð Þ½ zH p m mjð Þ½ 
ð16Þ
The first equality expresses free energy is terms of accuracy and
complexity, where the second complexity term just reports the
surprise about the conditional representation under prior beliefs.
The second equality is the corresponding path integral of free
energy (known as free action). Under ergodic assumptions [12,96]
this can be expressed as the conditional entropy of sensory input,
given the representations and the entropy of the internal states.
Equation 11 has two important implications. First, it shows that
minimising free energy, at each point in time, is equivalent to
minimising free action —by the fundamental lemma of variational
calculus. In other words, Equation 11 is just a restatement of the
principle of least action. Second, it shows that minimising free
energy maximises the accuracy of representations or minimises
their conditional uncertainty (entropy) over time. This is simply a
restatement of the principle of minimum redundancy or maximum
mutual information [97]. This follows because minimising
uncertainty about sensory inputs, given internal states, implicitly
maximises the mutual information between sensory and internal
states (for any given sensations):
I S,Rð Þ~H p s mjð Þ½ {H p s m,mjð Þ½  ð17Þ
This suggests that the infomax principle [97] is a special case of the
free-energy principle that is obtained when we discount uncer-
tainty and represent sensory input with point estimates of their
causes. In this context, high mutual information is assured by
maximising accuracy (e.g., minimising prediction error) and prior
beliefs are enforced by minimising complexity. Crucially, mini-
mising complexity minimises metabolic cost.
In short, the infomax principle can be understood in terms of
the decomposition of free energy into complexity and accuracy:
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mutual information or statistical efficiency is optimised when
conditional expectations maximise accuracy (or minimise predic-
tion error), while thermodynamic efficiency is assured by
minimising complexity. This minimisation ensures that the
generative model is not over-parameterized and leads to a
parsimonious representation of sensory data that conforms to
prior beliefs about their causes. Interestingly, advanced model
optimisation techniques use free-energy optimisation to eliminate
redundant model parameters [98], suggesting that free-energy
optimisation might provide a nice explanation for synaptic
pruning and homeostasis in the brain during neurodevelopment
[99] and sleep [100]. In developing the link between metabolic
and statistical efficiency, we have assumed that internal neuronal
states encode hidden states in terms of their most likely value or
expectation. Is there any principled reason to assume this form of
neuronal code?
The Maximum Entropy Principle and the Laplace
Assumption
Notice from Equation 7 that minimising variational free energy
entails maximising the entropy of the conditional density.
Intuitively, this is like keeping one’s options open when trying to
find hypotheses or explanations for sensory input. If we admit an
encoding of the conditional density up to second order moments,
then the maximum entropy principle [42], implicit in the
definition of free energy, requires q y ~mjð Þ~N ~m,Sð Þ to be
Gaussian. This is because a Gaussian density has the maximum
entropy of all forms that can be specified with two moments.
Assuming a Gaussian form is known as the Laplace assumption
and enables us to express the entropy of the conditional density in
terms of its first moment or expectation. This follows because we
can minimise free energy with respect to the conditional
covariance as follows:
F~U s,mð Þz 1
2
tr S:LmmU
 	
{
1
2
ln Sj j[LSF~ 1
2
LmmU{
1
2
P
LSF~0[
P~LmmU
F~U s,mð Þz 1
2
ln LmmU


 


( ð18Þ
Here, the conditional precision P(m) is the inverse of the
conditional covariance S(m). Equation 18 means the free energy
becomes a function of conditional expectations and sensory states.
This is important because it suggests the brain may represent
hidden states of the world in terms of their expected values. This
leads to the Laplace code (defined as neuronal encoding under the
Laplace assumption), which is arguably the simplest and most
flexible of all neuronal codes [13,14]. Furthermore, under the
Laplace code, one can minimise free energy efficiently using
predictive coding [29,31]. Predictive coding has become one of the
most popular ways of understanding message passing in the
brain—particularly in the setting of hierarchical perceptual
inference. In short, the free-energy principle entails the principle
of maximum entropy and leads, in a principled way, to a neuronal
encoding of representations in terms of conditional expectations.
The specific nature of the neural code may be exclusive to a
species or underlying neural function. Whatever its makeup—
expected latency, firing rate, spike timing, phase, etc.—it will exist
to harmonize the dialogue between perception and action. In
practice, we usually have in mind the instantaneous rate of firing of
neuronal populations, which means the internal states encoding
posterior beliefs are ensemble averages of ensemble averages—for
example, the expectation of (a function of) depolarisation over the
neuronal ensemble, where the depolarisation of a single neuron is
(a function of) the internal variables of a canonical ensemble.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the thermodynamic and computational
(statistical) imperatives for biological self-organisation, with a
special focus on neuronal circuits. We have considered the role of
classical thermodynamics and the notion of metabolic efficiency—
that appears to be an important constraint, under which
neurophysiology and neuroanatomy have evolved. From a
computational perspective, we have looked at variational free-
energy minimisation as the basis for active Bayesian inference and
modelling of the environment. The ability to represent and predict
hidden environmental states efficiently can be quantified in terms
of mutual information. Our synthesis suggests that minimising
variational free energy is a sufficient account of the tendency to
maximise both metabolic and statistical efficiency. The motivation
for minimising variational free energy is to minimise its long-term
average to maintain a constant external milieu—as measured by
the entropy of an organism’s sensory samples over time. By
decomposing variational free energy into accuracy and complexity
one can understand metabolic efficiency in terms of minimising
complexity (which minimises Helmholtz free energy), under the
computational constraint that sensory inputs are represented
accurately. Conversely, statistical efficiency can be understood in
terms of maximising the accuracy (which maximises mutual
information), under the constraint that representations have
minimal complexity. The link between complexity and metabolic
cost rests on the simple observation that, in the absence of sensory
input, prior beliefs are encoded by physical variables that minimise
Helmholtz free energy.
The nice thing about this formulation is that, under active
inference, organisms will selectively sample sensory inputs that
conform to their prior beliefs and minimise the complexity of their
representations. This means that biological systems will appear to
act in a way that minimises fluctuations in Helmholtz free
energy—and will aspire to the nonequilibrium steady state that has
been assigned to them by evolution.
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